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California’s Clean Car Law: Fifteen Years Later, a Look in 
the Rearview Mirror 
Darry Sragow and Monika Darwish* 
Fifteen years ago, before most Americans were certain that the globe is 
warming and our climate is changing, back when they still relied on daily 
newspapers and network broadcast television for much of their news, a 
small but hardy band of California environmental organizations and activists 
handed the auto industry an unexpected defeat.  This, it has been argued, 
marked the turning point that launched the far-reaching climate change 
regulatory schemes in place today, nationally and globally. 
The success of California’s 2002 Clean Car Law (AB 1493) is worth 
examining because it reflects the outcome determinative significance of 
three underlying dynamics that have defined the successes and failures of 
the environmental movement, broadly defined, in the United States for 
many decades.  Those are the importance of when and where a policy debate 
takes place; the decentralized, disaggregated structure of the environmental 
movement; and the critical role played by a relatively small number of 
committed governmental officials and advocates. 
Lessons learned in winning passage of this landmark legislation can 
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The Importance of Where and When the Inevitable Policy Debate 
Takes Place 
Under federal law, emissions standards are governed by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, but the State of California is authorized 
to establish and enforce more stringent emission standards subject to 
federal approval, and other states may choose whether they will adhere to 
the national or California standards.1  This policy reflects a recognition that 
parts of California face unique air quality issues due to specific 
meteorological conditions and heavy reliance on transport by automobile.  
For economic reasons, reflecting the size of the California market and 
magnified by the adoption of California emissions standards by many other 
states, vehicles sold in the U.S. are built to adhere to the tougher California 
standards.  
Reflecting California’s innovative leadership on emission reductions, 
the impetus for the Clean Car Law came from a pair of relatively small 
environmental organizations in the state, San Francisco-based Bluewater 
Network and the Coalition for Clean Air, with offices in Los Angeles and 
Sacramento.  Consistent with California’s unique preferences and authority 
with respect to motor vehicle emissions, these two groups and other 
eventual members of the coalition pursued their goal of regulating tailpipe 
emissions of greenhouse gases nationally by focusing on the California 
legislature rather than the Congress. 
Good timing, on the other hand, is often a function of good luck.  In 
retrospect, essential factors contributing to the passage of this measure 
included: relatively new term limits forced a constant turnover in the 
legislature, leading to the presence of a political newcomer and committed 
environmental advocate in the State Assembly; receptive legislators led both 
the Assembly and Senate; and, in the wake of a jarring shortage of generated 
electricity in California in 2000 and 2001, a heightened voter distrust of large 
corporations and a Governor facing a potentially difficult reelection 
campaign in 2002. 
 
Decentralized, Disaggregated Structure of the Environmental 
Movement 
After the election of George W. Bush in 2000, Russell Long, the 
Executive Director of a ten-person environmental group called Bluewater 
Network, looked to California as a venue for progressive environmental 
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legislation in the face of unreceptive federal leadership.2  Although the 
Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 prohibits states from regulating 
fuel economy, California’s Clean Air Act waiver authorized the state to 
regulate tailpipe emissions produced through fuel combustion during a 
vehicle’s operation.3  Long proposed that the state require a reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions from new automobiles.4  The transportation 
sector contributed fifty-eight percent of California’s greenhouse gas 
emissions, making it a logical target of opportunity.5  It was a simple but 
bold idea.6  Greenhouse gases were not yet regulated federally under the 
Clean Air Act. 
The job of advocating for environmental causes in the U.S. is shared by 
literally hundreds of nonprofit organizations.  A few have budgets in the 
many millions of dollars and membership rosters with tens of thousands of 
names, but most are a fraction of that size.  Their agendas often overlap and 
competing views are inevitable.  
Bluewater faced early opposition from key members of the California 
environmental community.  Some groups expressed general concern that 
the proposal was too much too soon without sufficient support from inside 
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the state Capitol.7  Other organizations were uncomfortable with the 
proposal for fear that it might compromise federal lobbying efforts.8   
Undaunted and indefatigable, Bluewater pressed its case.  The 
Coalition for Clean Air, became the first significant cosponsor.  The pair 
unsuccessfully asked eleven different legislators to carry the bill before 
approaching newly elected Fran Pavley, a former school teacher representing 
the western portion of the Los Angeles basin.9  Pavley showed up for work in 
Sacramento very much an unknown.  Not a political insider, she had, in fact, 
gotten to the Capitol by unexpectedly beating an opponent relatively well 
known in certain state and national political circles.  What appealed to 
Pavley about this proposal was that it was not intended as merely a 
symbolic gesture.10  Its sponsors meant business, as far-fetched as that 
seemed to experienced Sacramento insiders.11  She was very concerned that 
cars were the state’s biggest source of greenhouse gas emissions and 
wanted to tackle that issue.12  According to one of the key participants in this 
effort, as a freshman member, new to state politics and deadly earnest, 
Pavley was determined to do the right thing.13  
Pavley decided to introduce a bill that was straightforward.  The US 
EPA can deny a California Clean Air Act waiver request if the state’s 
standards are arbitrary and capricious, the state does not need such 
standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions, or the state’s 
enforcement mechanisms conflict with the Clean Air Act.14  Pavley chose to 
keep her bill’s objectives broad by excluding specific reduction targets from 
the statutory language.  By deferring to the ARB’s expertise, she intended to 
increase the odds that the bill would withstand inevitable legal challenges.  
Additionally, the list of legislative findings in the bill was intended to 
address the compelling and extraordinary reasons test required for a 
California Clean Air Act waiver approval. 
Once Pavley agreed to author the bill, Bluewater and the Coalition for 
Clean Air successfully solicited support from a number of local and state 
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environmental organizations including the California Public Interest 
Research Group (CALPIRG), Sierra Club California, and Greenpeace.15 
The bill received little notice in Sacramento until it was heard in the 
Assembly Transportation Committee in April 2001.16  That committee was 
viewed as unfriendly to legislation supported by environmentalists and the 
auto industry did not view the proposal as a serious threat, registering only 
“token opposition.”17 
Pavley and the bill sponsors originally anticipated pushback against 
the scientific certainty of climate change.18  Instead, opponents attacked the 
bill as a blank check granting unlimited authority to the California Air 
Resources Board.19 
To get the bill through the committee, Assemblyman Joe Simitian 
amended it to delay implementation by one year, giving the Legislature time 
to review, but not vote on, the regulations that the Air Resources Board 
would propose following enactment.20  The Committee also added a 
standard requiring that “maximum feasible reduction of carbon dioxide 
emitted from passenger vehicles” be cost effective.21  These amendments 
were intended to assuage concerns of ARB overreach and yielded support 
from the wavering committee members including the chairman.22  
The Transportation Committee approved the measure.  Now the auto 
industry was paying attention.  
Consistent with legislative procedure, the bill made its way to the 
Assembly Appropriations Committee in May 2001, where Speaker Bob 
Hertzberg was concerned over the stirring controversy.23  As Chair of the 
committee, he agreed to sign off on the bill only after proponents promised 
to wait until the following January for a vote on the Assembly floor.24  This 
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gave Pavley eight months to muster support among her Assembly 
colleagues.25  
As noted by Governing Magazine when it honored Pavley as a 2003 
Public Official of the Year, “if governmental achievement is often a function 
of persistence, it’s worth remembering that on occasion it is the product of 
sheer audacity. [. . .] Told that she was wasting her time, that automakers 
and oil companies would spend millions to prevent any such law from being 
enacted, Pavley persisted, out of what she now admits was mostly naivete.”26 
Lobbying fellow Assembly members for support was not an easy task.27  
Pavley and the coalition were asking her colleagues to take on a high-power 
interest group with plenty of resources to convince constituents that the 
Pavley measure would increase gas prices.  The auto industry had all the 
money it needed to purchase ads and mount voter contact programs, and 
had a friendly, local face for such a campaign in the form of local car 
dealers.28  Car dealerships are often major contributors to the local tax base 
in their community.  
Pavley and the coalition could not match the auto industry’s advocacy 
budget dollar-for-dollar.  They decided to level the playing field by building 
a broad support coalition that would articulate the bill’s benefits at a 
personal and community level.  
Slowly but surely, the fragmented environmental players assembled an 
effective working coalition that ultimately extended beyond the bounds of 
the traditional environmental community.  The California League of 
Conservation Voters, Environmental Defense, Union of Concerned 
Scientists, Planning and Conservation League, and Clean Power Campaign 
all registered their formal support.29  NRDC and Sierra Club even joined 
Bluewater Network and Coalition for Clean Air as cosponsors.30  A political 
strategist was retained to oversee limited opinion research and a modest 
campaign fund aimed at nursing the development of and adherence to a 
multi-organizational support effort.  
For example, several members of the Latino Caucus were already 
concerned with air quality issues in their Los Angeles and Central Valley 
districts.  One of their leaders, Senator Martha Escutia, invited Pavley to 
present her bill to the caucus.31  The presentation sparked several 
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discussions on air quality issues that could be addressed in conjunction 
with the Clean Car Law.32  Legislators representing districts in the Central 
Valley, where air quality problems were especially severe, were frustrated 
that their constituents were required to get smog checks, but Bay Area 
residents were not.33  Ultimately, Pavley enlisted Senate President Pro Tem 
John Burton, who represented parts of the Bay Area, to support their 
legislation making smog checks mandatory in the San Francisco Bay Area 
Basin.34 
Concerns with the health implications of climate change led to 
support from the American Lung Association, Physicians for Social 
Responsibility, California Medical Association, and the California Nurses 
Association.35  Pavley recalls that this was the first time the American Lung 
Association took a formal stance on a piece of California legislation.36  
Religious organizations, led by the California Interfaith Council of 
Power and Light, also played an important role in reminding legislators of 
their moral obligations to protect the planet.37 
In the days before social media, newspaper editorial support was 
considered especially influential with state decision makers and opinion 
leaders.38  With the exception of the Orange County Register, Pavley and her 
team gained the strong support of every major editorial board in the state.39  
They also found local level support from air districts, water districts, 
cities, counties, and local officials across the state. 
Business leaders and Environmental Entrepreneurs, or E-2, a Silicon 
Valley-based group of environmentally conscious business owners and 
investors also joined the effort.  This was E-2’s first foray into legislative 
lobbying.  
By the end of 2001, Pavley had added nearly twenty coauthors to the 
bill, including the two leaders of the Latino Caucus: Senator Martha Escutia 
and Assembly Majority Leader Marco Firebaugh.40  
This significant expansion of the coalition, activating broad support in 
the environmental community, but also, significantly, recruiting credible 
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messengers on the effects of global warming from the ranks of interest 
groups not often associated with environmental issues, escaped the notice 
of the bill’s opponents.  Much to their surprise, on January 30th, 2002 the 
bill was approved by the Assembly, 42-24, with bipartisan support and votes 
to spare.41  
 
The Critical Role Played by a Relatively Small Number of 
Committed Governmental Officials and Advocates 
In April 2002, with the bill pending in the Senate Appropriations 
Committee, the auto industry deployed its financial resources that far 
exceeded anything the proponents could hope to muster.  Joined by the 
California Chamber of Commerce, the United Auto Workers, and the 
California Manufacturers and Technology Association; the Alliance of 
Automobile Manufacturers launched a five-million-dollar ad campaign 
labeling the bill as a car tax that would ban SUV’s.  Television 
advertisements featured legendary car salesman Cal Worthington warning 
Californians to fear AB 1058.42  The industry also launched a grass roots 
online campaign at www.wedrive.org, rallying constituents to lobby against 
what they described as an ill-considered plan that would prevent soccer-
moms from driving their SUVs.43   
The amount of money being spent by the industry to kill the bill left 
many members of the coalition in despair.  They knew there was no way for 
proponents to raise funds sufficient to counter the industry on television 
and turned to their campaign strategist for advice on steps they could take 
in hopes of weathering the storm.  Their adviser, who had managed a 
number of campaigns for statewide office in California and served as the 
campaign strategist for the Assembly Democratic Caucus, urged them to be 
patient.  It was his view, based on opinion research and intuition, that the 
industry ad campaign would backfire.  “No one believes anything that car 
salesmen say about the cars they sell; why would they believe what a car 
salesman says about the environment,” he cautioned.  Still, he added that 
unquestionably the entire industry opposition effort, including the well-
financed ads and heavy lobbying in the Capitol, made passage no sure thing. 
In the meantime, in Sacramento Pavley’s roster of supporters had been 
growing.   
As soon as the bill made its way to the environmentally friendly 
Senate, President pro Tempore John Burton took it under his wing and made 
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it a priority.  His own staff remarked that Burton worked harder on Pavley’s 
Clean Car Law than he did on his own bills.44  As one key participant noted, 
the bill “grabbed the auto industry by the tail and went right to the cause.  
That is kind of how Burton got into issues.”45  Burton’s commitment was 
threefold.  First, he wanted the state to reclaim its role as a leader in 
environmental issues.46  Second, he knew enough about the science of 
climate change to recognize its potentially catastrophic effects.47  Third, he 
understood the bill’s monumental implications when combined with 
California’s authority under the federal Clean Air Act.48   
Yet Burton did not want credit for the bill.  He never put his name on 
it, and did not attend the bill signing.49  He felt that he could best serve the 
cause by crafting an effective, behind-the-scenes strategy.50   
Upon its arrival from the Assembly, Burton directed the Rules 
Committee to refer AB 1058 to the Environmental Quality Committee, 
chaired by Senator Byron Sher, instead of the less friendly Transportation 
Committee where precedent would have otherwise sent the bill. 51  The issue 
of greenhouse gases was relatively new to the legislature, but fit squarely 
within the jurisdiction of the Environmental Quality Committee where 
Burton and Sher were sure the bill would pass.52  This was a decisive move, 
which prevented the auto industry from killing the bill or forcing hostile 
amendments.53  
When the United Automobile Workers lobbied other labor groups to 
oppose the legislation, Burton stepped in.54  He made clear how strongly he 
supported the bill and warned other unions that their neutrality could be 
tolerated, but not their opposition.55  In the end, the United Automobile 
Workers remained the only labor group to oppose the bill.56   
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Because the auto industry opposition campaign identified the 
measure by its original bill number, AB 1058, Burton decided to employ a 
tactic often used by the California legislature, known as a “gut-and-amend.”  
A gut-and-amend entailed taking the entire language of the original bill, AB 
1058, and substituting it for unrelated language in another bill, that 
pursuant to the legislature’s rules, was procedurally eligible to be 
considered for passage, AB 1493.  In essence a rebranding exercise, the gut-
and-amend allowed legislators to vote on the legislation’s substance 
without voting for the bill number targeted by the auto industry. 
The gut-and-amend bill included clarifying amendments addressing 
concerns raised by the auto industry opposition campaign.  The 
amendments specified that the Air Resources Board could not limit the 
number of miles motorists could drive, raise gas taxes, or restrict the type of 
vehicle consumers could purchase.57  The Senate passed AB 1493 on 
Saturday, June 29, 2002, with a 23-6 vote.   
Newly elected Assembly Speaker Herb Wesson, Pavley’s seatmate at 
the time, consistently supported the bill but was not always certain how 
much effort to exert in ensuring its passage.58  Proponents found creative 
ways to encourage him to make this measure’s success one of his top 
priorities.  They arranged for Congressman John Lewis to call Wesson, an 
avid Civil Rights Movement history buff, to underscore the vote’s national 
importance.59  President Bill Clinton called Wesson.60  Capitol observers 
tease that Wesson jumped in with both feet after Pavley jokingly presented 
him with an autographed picture of his celebrity crush, Jennifer Lopez.61  He 
hung the framed photo on the wall in his Speaker’s office.62   
Wesson’s commitment was critical.63  He rallied support from other 
Assembly members and ensured that key votes on the bill were scheduled 
only when passage was certain.64  Coalition support for his recruitment effort 
included identifying the local offices for which soon-to-be termed out 
legislators would run, and encouraging elected officials in those 
communities to voice support for the bill.  
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Within forty-eight hours after the Senate approved AB 1493, Wesson 
had ushered the bill through the Assembly Transportation Committee and 
onto the floor, where it passed with 41 votes, the exact number required.65  
Governor Gray Davis had tasked two key appointees to work with the 
legislature on language that he would be comfortable signing, focused on 
cost effectiveness and feasibility.66  The signing ceremonies at the Griffith 
Park Observatory in Los Angeles and at the Presidio overlooking the Golden 
Gate Bridge in San Francisco were covered by press from across the nation 
and the world. At the ceremony, Davis declared that, “the sky is not falling, 
it’s only getting cleaner.”67  
Had either legislative leader, Burton or Wesson, or Governor Davis 
waivered in the face of industry opposition, the bill never would have 
become law.   
 
Lessons Learned 
That a school teacher turned legislator could, in her first few months in 
office, launch a successful challenge to one of the most powerful industries 
in America and the world is remarkable.  The unexpected enactment of the 
Clean Car Law in California in 2002 emboldened the environmental 
movement, and was directly responsible for the passage of California’s 
landmark Global Warming Solutions Act, AB 32, in 2006, and all the 
measures in California and elsewhere that limit the emission of greenhouse 
gases.   
The bill’s legacy extends far beyond its immediate greenhouse gas 
reductions.  The first of its kind anywhere in the world, it emboldened the 
environmental community and its supporters to press forward in their fight 
to mitigate global warming.  
Proponents of strong public policy initiatives to address the causes 
and consequences of climate change would be well advised to pick their 
venues with care; to launch at opportune moments; to cultivate active, 
unyielding support from the elected and other public officials who genuinely 
determine outcomes; and to seize on the disaggregated, decentralized 
nature of the environmental movement as a strength.  Environmentalists 
will always be outspent by those whom they seek to regulate.  But their 
commitment, their passion, and the inevitability that they will speak not 
with one voice, but with many voices, are, in the political arena, valuable 
strengths.   
 
 
 65. Telephone Interview with Fran Pavley (Oct. 12, 2017). 
 66. See Pavley, supra note 4, at 369. 
 67. Id. 
